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The police received an anonymous telephone call informing them that
two unidentified cars met periodically at night at a particular place under
circumstances arousing suspicion. Two officers patrolled the area on the
night following receipt of this "tip," and observed the cars. Before the
occupants could be questioned, the cars pulled away. The officers pursued but lost them in traffic. Shortly thereafter, one of the officers stopped
a car driven by defendant, thinking it might be one of the cars he was after.
The officer examined the defendant's driver's license and flashed his
light into the interior of the car. According to the officer's own testimony,
while inquiring about a package lying on the rear seat, "he sort of lifted
it up," and looked under it. Thereupon a passenger voluntarily stepped
from the car and attempted to push two packages beneath it with her foot.
In these packages were unlawful lottery tickets and money, which the
officers seized. These were offered in evidence at the trial for unlawful
possession of lottery tickets, which followed. Held, that the fact that the
officer, after halting the car, inquired as to what was in the package on the
backseat, and flashed his light in the car, "might not be said to have
amounted to a search," however, when he reached into the car, picked up
the package and looked under it, he was without doubt making a search.
Under the circumstances the search and subsequent seizure were unlawful,
and under the so-called federal rule (followed in Florida) the contraband
seized was not admissible in evidence. Kraemer et al. v. State, 60 So.2d 615
(Fla. 1952).
It is not the purpose of this article to go into the doctrine of unlawful
or unreasonable searches and seizures.' Thus, there will be no attempt to
discuss the constitutional aspects of searches and seizures, nor the admissibility in evidence of articles obtained as a result of unlawful searches
and seizures.
A search has been defined as "an examination of a man's home, premises, or person for the purpose of discovering proof 'of his guilt in relation
to some crime or misdemeanor of which he is accused."' Several cases
have indicated that this "examination" must involve something more than
mere observation of an article in obvious view, in order to constitute a
search.
For example, in a Missouri case 2 a store manager and a policeman
seeking to recover stolen merchandise came upon defendant's parked car
and upon looking into the car saw the alleged stolen merchandise. The
court held that these facts were insufficient to constitute a search, .saying
that a search means of necessity, a quest for, or a seeking out of, that which
offends the law. It implies a "prying into hidden places for that which
1.
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Bou vier's L. Dict., 3rd Ed.
State v. Hawkins, 362 Mo. 146, 240 S.W.2d 688 (1951)
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is concealed." It is not a search to observe that which is open and patent,
in either sunlight or artificial light.
In a federal case,3 a defendant drove up in an automobile near some
officers and alighted. One of the officers walked around the back of the
car to the opposite side, and noticed that the rear door was open. He
turned his flashlight on the floor of the car and saw some contraband.
These circumstances were held insufficient to constitute a search, which,
said the court, means some exploratory invesigatiorf.
In Boyd v. United States,4 the defendant was standing a short distance
from his parked automobile on the side of the road. A prohibition officer
"looked into the car" and saw two gallons of whiskey in fruit jars on the
back seat. The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held that
it is not a search in any legal or colloquial sense for an officer to look into
an automobile standing on the roadside.
While waiting for the passage of a freight train across the highway,
two policeman in South Carolina disembarked from their car to look into
the defendant's car, where they saw unconcealed liquor. A search, said
this court, implies invasion and quest, some sort of force, actual or constructive, much or little.5
In People v. Exum,6 officers took articles from the front and rear seat
of the defendant's car. He disclaimed all interest in or knowledge of the
articles, but contended his automobile had been searched. The court held
that a search implies a "prying into hidden places for that which is concealed," and it is not a search to observe that which is open to view; hence,
no search had been made.
While looking through a transom into the rented room of the defendant, in the District of Columbia, the police observed the commission of a
misdemeanor. In holding that there had not been a search, the court
pointed out that although it has been said that, ordinarily, searching is
a function of the sight, it is generally held that a mere looking at that
7
which is open to view is not a search.
A Wyoming district court cause involving the problem of what constitutes a search was recently decided by Judge Glenn Parker of the Second Judicial District. 8 The defendant ran a bar which had an adjoining room where
slot machines were being operated. An officer, apparently looking for the
slot machines, walked into this adjoining room. The evidence was uncontradicted that th. machines were being operated at the time the officers
first saw them. The officer had some discussion with the bartender and
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State v. Quinn, 111 S.C. 174, 97 S.E. 62, 3 A.L.R. 1500 (1918).
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McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957, reversed on other grounds, 335 U.S. 451,
69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).
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told him he was going to seize the machines. He then called the sheriff's
office for a truck which hauled them away. There was no affidavit filed
or search warrant issued. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence because of illegal search. In deciding the case it was first necessary for the
court to determine whether there had been a search. In holding that
there had been no search, Judge Parker wrote:
"The evidence is clear that the rooms from which the machines
were taken formed a part of or at least were used in connection
with the bar. This room was open to the public and was used
.by anyone who chose to enter the establishment which catered to
everyone. The machines were in plain view and were each
imprinted with words and symbols to indicate that they were
gambling devices.
"The principle seems well established that: Where no search
is required, the constitutional guarantee is not applicable. The
guarantee applies only in those instances where the seizure is
assisted by a necessary search. It does not prohibit a search without
a warrant where there is no need of a search and where the contraband subject matter is fully disclosed and open to the eye and
hand." 9
In the light of the preceding authorities, Kraemer et al. v. State appears
to be a borderline case. Had the packages of lottery tickets and money
been discovered as a result of the rummaging by the officer, and the "sort
of lifting up" which he did, it would have been correct to hold that a
search was made. These actions of the officer constituted something
more than the observation of articles which were open and patent; he was
"prying into hidden places for that which was concealed." Since, however,
the contraband was not discovered until the passenger voluntarily stepped
out of the car and attempted to push the packages underneath, and, when
discovered, the packages were in view on the public highway, it is submitted that the dissenting judge was probably correct in concluding that
the contraband was not obtained as the result of a search.
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At this point the judge cited the following authorities: 47 Am. Jur. "Searches and
Seizures," paragraph 20, note 17, page 516, citing 3 A.L.R. 1453. To a similar effect
is 56 C.J.: "Searches and Seizures," paragraph 82, note 72, which cites U.S. v. Robstein,
14 F.2d 227, which case cites in re: Lobosco, 11 F.2d 892. The judge added, "The
part of the premises commercially used as a store may be entered without a search
warrant. There is no search made where articles are in plain view of officers who
may. as any other member of the public, enter a place open to anyone." Note 130
U.S.C.A. Constitution, Amend. 4.

